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Abstract
This paper will identify the relationship between financial openness and trade volatil-
ity in Argentina. Data spanning 1970-2011 provided by the IMF, WTO, and INDEC will
be used to construct a panel dataset for both a global analysis and a sectoral analysis
for the Argentine economy. The application of established and accepted techniques to
the constructed dataset will show a negative correlation between trade volatility and
financial openness; thus, financial openness acts as a stabilizing mechanism for trade.
Additional analysis will be performed on the of role regional trade agreements as stabi-
lization mechanisms for trade. A significant implication of this study is to illustrate the
imperative for developing economies to financially integrate in order to stabilize trade,
thereby stabilizing and promoting future growth and investment within their respective
economies.
∗I would like to thank M.C. Wong (my advisor), Suparna Chakraborty, Danilo Trupkin of the University
of Buenos Aires, University of San Francisco’s MS International and Development Economics class of 2016,
and many others for useful inputs and assistance with the data collection. Funding from the University of San
Francisco is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are my own.
1 Introduction
Since entering the period of globalization in the mid-1980s, economists have placed an
emphasis on the role that global financial integration can play in the growth and development
of the worlds economies. Numerous articles have been written and analyses performed that
observe the correlation between financial integration and growth; however, fewer have explored
the mechanism by which this growth occurs.
This paper will attempt to explain one of these mechanisms: specifically, trade volatil-
ity. If it can be shown that trade volatility can be reduced in the presence of higher global
financial openness, important policy measures can be taken to strengthen the financial open-
ness of developing and emerging economies. An exploratory piece such as this can provide
an important first step towards understanding the role of financial openness as more than
a means to growth, but rather as a tool to provide regional and global economic stability.
Recently, there has been some attention drawn to the necessity of financial openness with
emerging and developing economies. However, this attention precludes the notion of trade
stability. With reduced trade volatility more predictable growth can occur, thus spurring
further private investment on capital based upon the notion of predictable returns. Thus the
link between financial openness and growth is established with trade volatility acting as a
crucial mechanism.
It is important that an analysis such as this is performed, not only for developing economies,
but also for the developed economies. If it is shown that financial openness is a means to
stabilize trade, these developed economies can utilize this method with developing economies
with which they intend to trade; thereby securing a more profitable partnership. For example,
a unique understanding such as this can provide a wealth of benefits to Central and Latin
America which has long stood as a trading partner with the United States, yet is frequently
under integrated financially.
It is the intent of this analysis to provide a better understanding of the intermediary
mechanism between financial integration and growth, and to answer the underlying question:
Does financial openness affect trade volatility?
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the theory and advantages
of financial openness; Section 3 presents the methodology for the study, which outlines how
the data is collected and the empirical model and hypothesis; Section 4 focuses on the results
of the study and Section 5 presents the conclusion and implication of the study.
2 Literature Review
2.1 A Brief Word on Exchange Rates
Although the subsequent analysis investigates the role of Financial Openness on trade
volatility, it would first be prudent to explore what other components of trade might also
affect volatility. Traditionally we understand trade through the frameworks of comparative
advantage (Ricardian, Hecksher Ohlin, Samuelsen), geographic (Gravity), political, and mar-
ket structures. While these frameworks do an adequate job of explaining direction of trade
and perhaps the volume of trade, we are more concerned with the volatility of trade.
The linkages between financial integration, trade volatility, and GDP growth is constructed
upon the underlying premise that trade volatility does indeed affect growth in the near and
long term. From this underlying assumption, we can then study how financial integration will
affect growth via trade volatility. In a formative piece, Ramey et al (1995) demonstrated the
link between volatility and growth. In a subsequent paper, Imbs (2005) also demonstrated a
negative correlation between growth and volatility. However, in neither paper was it explored
the source or explanatory mechanism of this volatility.
One might suggest that an underlying factor or explanatory mechanism that affects volatil-
ity is the inherent relationship between exchange rates on trade. Despite this reasonable as-
sumption, it should be stated that the extent to which there is an effect is not quite so certain.
Some authors have found that exchange rate stability is not necessarily associated with less
trade volatility. (Bacchetta, 2000) While others have found that indeed there is a positive
relationship between exchange rate stability and trade stability; particularly amongst more fi-
nancially developed economies. (Hericourt, 2013) This seemingly contradictory position leads
one to believe that exchange rate fluctuations can affect trade volatility differently, or that
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perhaps there is no definitive link.
To further the point, small open economies such as Chile and New Zealand were found
to be affected more by exchange rate fluctuations than larger economies. (Bourdon, 2012).
Although this may in fact be the case, Bourdon et al. was unable to definitively ascertain the
direction of impact because their findings show that exchange rates affect sectors differently
within a given economy. This serves to reiterate the notion that exchange rate stability (or
lack thereof) cannot be entirely responsible for trade stability.
Furthermore, utilizing a firm-level approach from 100,000 Chinese firms to investigate the
effect of exchange rate fluctuations on exports, it was found that a trade-deterring effect could
be seen in the presence of exchange rate fluctuations. (Hericourt, 2013) The authors also found
that exports were less likely to enter new markets with higher exchange rate volatility. Lastly,
in another firm-level study conducted in France, there were differences seen in the way that
high performance and low performance firms react to exchange rate fluctuations. (Berman,
2009) Thus we can ascertain that the configuration of an economy will behave differently with
respect to changes in exchange rates.
2.2 General Overview of the Theory of Financial Integration
At this point one can conclude exchange rate stability cannot be identified as primary mech-
anism of trade volatility due to the lack of cohesive findings in current literature. Therefore
one must ask, What other mechanisms can affect trade volatility? Therein lies the magni-
tude and importance of this analysis; it is to answer a fundamental question that can provide
insight to the causes of trade volatility that havent already been examined.
Unfortunately there have not been to my knowledge many empirical studies of openness
and trade volatility, however, we are not without some underlying theory. It is often thought
that financial integration provides a host of potential important benefits. As we have seen
in the last several paragraphs with regard to exchange rates, the effects arent always promi-
nently seen. Many have argued that access to world capital markets allow nations to borrow
and smooth consumption when faced with adverse macroeconomic shocks. Furthermore, in-
tegration and access to these markets provide a kind of risk sharing that can be large and
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permanent. (Obstfeld 1994) However it is often neglected that this same risk sharing quickly
turn negative through the form of contagion and reverse capital flows. (Agenor 2003) Before
we discuss the potential negatives, let us first outline the potential benefits and how they
might impact macroeconomic volatility:
• Consumption Smoothing This will have an obvious effect on macroeconomic volatility
[MV]. If a nation is undergoing a negative shock, they can borrow from the capital
markets. This smoothing effect is especially important if the shock itself is temporary
in nature.
• Enhanced macroeconomic discipline It is thought that by participating in the global
capital markets, the nations will be induced to follow better macroeconomic policies
and therefore reduce the number of policy mistakes. (Obstfeld 1998) This will have an
obvious and probably large impact on MV. Thus participation encourages MV stability
and overall growth
• Banking efficiency and stability The idea is that the presence of foreign banks and
participation in global capital markets will improve the quality and efficiency of domestic
banking services; thus smoothing consumption. Additionally, the foreign banks may
reduce or event prevent capital flight during times of domestic crisis. Again, this will
clearly reduce MV.
2.3 Financial Integration affecting Trade Volatility
Thus through an aggregate process we might be able to conclude that consumption smooth-
ing of individual firms and households in an economy might directly affect trade via the
smoothing effect; in other words, trade should become less volatile in economies where there
is greater financial openness due to smoother consumption of households and production of
firms. This relationship is best described using two equations and a formal definition. The
first equation is the individual decomposition of the changes in consumption, and the second
equation is the aggregate decomposition. Each equation is utilized in the work Financial
Openness and Consumption Smoothing by Jappelli (2011) whose proofs and underpinnings
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are found in Blundell (1998). The first equation is as follows:
lnci,a,t = lnci,a−1,t−1 + z′i,a,tγ + Φui,a,t + Ψei,a,t (1)
Where c is consumption, z are preference shifts, is the slope of consumption, is the
response to permanent shocks, is the response to transitory shocks, and both u and e are the
shocks respectively. Thus we succinctly see that a change in consumption is a function of last
periods consumption, personal preferences, and sensitivity to shocks. Most importantly, the
sensitivity parameter will become lower with increased financial openness; thus consumption
becomes less sensitive to transitory shocks and is inherently smoother.
The aggregated decomposition equation is extremely similar to the individual decomposi-
tion equation with the ommittance of individual preference and is as follows:
lnci,a,t = lnci,a0,t−a+a0 + Φ
a∑
j=a0+1
ui,j,t−a+j + Ψ
a∑
j=a0+1
ei,j,t−a+j (2)
Where again, we find that is the main parameter of interest. Thus, when aggregated,
changes in consumption are still affected by transitory shocks. In Jappelli (2011) we know
that the value of the PSI parameter is lowered in the presence of greater financial openness.
Therefore in the presence of a transitory shock to income and under financially open conditions,
diminished changes in consumption will be observed. This is the consumption smoothing effect
that has been explicitly outlined in the existing literature.
The final piece of the underlying theory that would explain the channel by which financial
openness can smooth trade relies strictly upon the definition of trade itself. Up to this point
we have had to rely upon the published work of Jappelli, Blundell, and Agenor to illustrate
the phenomena of consumption smoothing and the direct role financial openness plays in that
mechanism. Now we will utilize two definitions to complete the arc; the definition of output,
and the definition of trade. Under the definition of Net Exports we have:
NX = X(Er, Y f )− ErM(Er, Y, T, r, ) (3)
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This is a definition which all are familiar with, and needs no further explanation. It is
important to note, however, the significance of consumption on output and domestic demand.
As domestic output changes due to changes in consumption, domestic demand will also change
because they inextricably linked. Using this definition, it is clear that the value of imports is
dependent upon domestic output and demand among other things. This is might conceivably
be especially true in the case of an “import heavy” economy. Thus we see that through
consumption and domestic output, financial openness can indeed affect trade.
3 Methodology
3.1 Data Sources
Constructing the panel data will require three main sources of information. The first source,
provided by the WTO, is the Trade Statistics Catalogue which will allow for the computation
of the trade volatility as the independent variable. It comprises 157 trading entities since
1970 and is compiled on an annual basis. This method and approach was taken from the 2007
working paper by Andrew K. Rose entitled, Does the WTO Make Trade More Stable. His
methodology and approach will be outlined in detail in the subsequent methodology section.
The second source of data is also provided by the IMF and will be used in both methods
to compute the degree to which an economy is financially integrated with the global econ-
omy. The Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER)
provides an annual country by country index of all 187 IMF entities since 1970. Specifically,
it provides a country by country account on current international payments and transfers, as
well as arrangements for payments and receipts. This method and approach is modeled after
the work of Jean Imbs (2005) entitled, The Real Effects of Financial Integration. However,
more specifically we will be using the Chinn-Ito Index which is based off of the AREAER.
The method will be outlined in detail in the subsequent methodology section.
The third source of data comes from in the Penn World Tables 8.1 (PWT81) and will be
used to provide total population and real gross domestic product for each country since 1970.
And lastly, the final source of data used is provided by INDEC which details the annual data
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from 17 different sectors in the Argentine economy since 1991. The method with which we
will use this data will be outlined in the subsequent section.
3.2 Conceptual Model
Prior to examining the complete regression, it is important to compose and analyze the two
main variables that will be utilized. For the dependent variable, trade volatility, a measure-
ment will be taken as follows:
TradeV olatility = σ(Trade)i,t,p (4)
Where volatility is the standard deviation of Trade of country [i] in time [t] during time
period [p]. Based on the work of Rose, the inclusion of both measurements of time is done
to produce a frame from which volatility can be measured; volatility itself must be measured
over time periods. This study differs from his in an important way, however: in Rose’s (2004)
work, he uses a time period of 5 and 10 years, which may indeed suit the purposes of his work,
but would fail to adequately fit the quarterly data used in Argentina. For this reason, time
period specifications of 4, 6, and 8 years have been to selected to measure the trade volatility.
It should be stated, that although the time period specifications do extend to 8 years, financial
openness is not expected to affect volatility more than only a few years. The inclusion of the
longer time periods is done for robustness and out of a great deal of precaution as a sensitivity
test.
The main independent variable of interest that must be constructed is the measurement
of financial openness. This variable is readily available to us using the Chinn-Ito Index and
is represented in our model as follows:
FinancialOpenness = µ(KAopen)i,t,p (5)
The variable is straightforward and does not lend itself to modification. An average of the
index is taken which corresponds to the length of timeframe used in the independent variable;
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thus they are matching in time length.
For our analysis, we will examine the results of the Global regression primarily using the
timeframe of 8. This is done to reduce the AIC while still maintain the highest possible R-
squared. The analysis of the Argentine regression will be done primarily through the timeframe
of 4, due to loss of observable data if the timeframe is expanded.
3.3 Econometric Specification
Finally, using the constructed independent and dependent variables, two complete models
can be formed. The strictly Argentine sectoral model is a follows:
σ(Sector)t,p = β0 + β1µ(KAopen)t,p + β2(PesoCrisis) + β3(Controls) +  (6)
There are also controls for real GDP, which is lagged one year to avoid endogeneity, as well
as added controls for population. Additionally, specific year and country fixed effects have
been included for robustness.
In the more broad global financial integration model, the specified regression is as follows:
σ(Trade)i,t,p = β0 + β1µ(KAopen)i,t,p + β2(RTA) + β3(Controls) +  (7)
With exception of the dependent variables and the inclusion of the Peso Crisis or RTA
independent, all other variables remain identical to the first strictly Argentine model and hold
by the same assumptions. In both regressions there are controls for GDP, Population, and four
Financial Crises. It should be noted that in both forms of the model the dependent variable
will be assessed at the three time periods specified above; 4, 6, and 8. This, in conjunction
with the two models, will provide six regressions from which the analysis will be performed,
and should satisfy a certain degree of robustness in the results.
Therefore we expect to find a negative correlation between financial integration and trade
volatility; implying that greater financial integration increases trade stability.
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4 Results
4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1: Global Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Import Volatility 4968 4319.389 12753.08 1.448084 229884.9
Export Volatility 4968 4124.473 12567.96 0.29137 218412.8
Financial Openness 4739 -0.03917 1.454272 -1.8889 2.389668
Log GDP 4956 10.21399 2.214506 4.935684 16.38753
Exchange Rate 4956 287.2312 1220.648 3.34E-12 17024.29
Table 2: Argentine Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Imports CIF Volatility 55 547.1535 281.7417 127.3058 1457.948
Imports FOB Volatility 55 514.277 263.6056 115.8766 1379.532
Exports FOB Volatility 55 747.8532 223.8233 140.9605 1615.04
Financial Openness 55 0.558693 1.230513 -1.18766 2.389668
Log GDP 55 12.87894 0.124787 12.56912 13.13213
Exchange Rate 55 1.887866 0.976725 0.999008 3.119907
4.2 Global Analysis
First we will examine the WTO outputs which will serve as a proof of concept. The very
first thing we see is that there is indeed a negative correlation between trade volatility and
financial openness. With this link established, it can serve to add impetus to the crucial
nature of financially integrating emerging and developing economies to stabilize trade in those
economies.
Examining the global regressions further we find some general trends: To reiterate, Finan-
cial Openness is negatively correlated with trade volatility. Although it is only statistically
significant at 10% for Exports in all three period timeframes, it is still nevertheless what we
expected to find and is negative in both Imports and Exports. Furthermore, the signs remain
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consistent throughout the three period timeframes and their coefficients increase slightly as
the period timeframe is expanded from four to eight. This could very well be due to the
construction of the timeframes themselves; eight periods would allow the capture of more
volatility, and perhaps should be interpreted as being just that. However, the most important
finding from all of this is that an empirical contemporaneous relationship is evident, consis-
tent, and significant. This will allow us to proceed later with a foundation for the Argentine
volatility having now seen it on a global level.
As we continue to examine the global regressions results, we find that Population as ex-
pected is negatively correlated in both Imports and Exports along with Exchange Rate in
all three period timeframes. Interestingly, the coefficient for Real GDP becomes increasingly
significant as the period timeframe expands. Unlike the other coefficients that generally re-
main at the same level of significance throughout the three timeframes, Real GDP moves from
not being significant in Imports of Exports during a four year period, to being significant at
the 5% level in an eight year period. Although the sign and magnitude were expected and
remain consistent, its significance does not remain consistent. This can again be possibly
attributed to the larger time period being able to capture the volatility slightly better than a
smaller timeframe. Still, it should be reiterated that the positive relationship is established
and obviously shouldnt be seen as anomalous.
With regard to the relationship of trade agreements and trade volatility, we find that
they are generally stabilizing (reduced volatility) with two major exceptions; NAFTA and
the WTO. In the specific case of NAFTA, Export volatility is increased by approximately $17
billion and is significant at the 10% level throughout all three period timeframes. Furthermore,
the Import volatility coefficient is nearly twice that in all three period timeframes, however, it
is not significant at any level. This can possibly be explained by the countries involved in the
RTA. All three economies are strongly tied to that of the United States, therefore if the United
States experiences volatility (during a recessions or crises) it is also plausible to say the other
two economies will be affected as well. In other words, this RTA is not as diversified as the
other RTAs controlled for here. In the case of the WTO, although it does show a comparatively
small positive relationship it isnt significant at any level in any timeframe. The most notable
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and important finding with respect to the WTO is that it confirms what Rose (2004) found in
his bilateral empirical analysis; it confirms that the WTO does not necessarily stabilize trade
as the organization claims. To the contrary, the evidence here shows that there is a dubious
relationship at best, and perhaps even a detrimental impact due to increased volatility at
worst. With regard to the other six RTAs (SAFTA GAFTA CAFTA CEFTA COMESA), we
find what we might expect membership produces a stabilizing impact on trade volatility. With
the exception of two RTAs, the relationship is generally small and not statistically significant;
however it is consistent across all three time periods. With regard to CAFTA it has a highly
significant coefficient at 1% and reduces volatility of its member economies by approximately
$6 billion in both Imports and Exports. This, albeit small in the global economy, is important
considering the members of CAFTA are smaller Central American economies. Likewise we
find a highly significant coefficient at 1% for COMESA in all three period timeframes, however,
the coefficients magnitude sharply decreases from approximately $7 billion in a four year time
period to $4 billion in the six and eight timeframes. This would suggest that although its
members do enjoy more trade stability, the extent to which membership protects it from
volatility is lesser in the long run.
Finally, it is important to examine the effect of four major financial crises during the
1970-2011 timespan. As expected, we find that the presence of a crisis does increase volatility.
However, it appears that the significance of the coefficients and the magnitude of them tend to
decrease through the three period timeframes. In the specific instance of the Global Crisis of
2008, the magnitude is relatively and comparatively large and highly significant throughout all
three period timeframes in both Import and Export, whereas with the other crises volatility
is comparatively small and the effect is significantly diminished. The lone inconsistency is
that Latin American Crisis where Export volatility is negative during the four and six period
timeframes, yet changes sign and magnitude to positive in the eight period timeframe. This,
like previous analysis, it believed to be the result of an expanded capture period whereby
volatility can be measured over a longer period.
Before an analysis is performed on the Argentine quarterly data, it would be prudent
to first review the conclusions made from the global data: Financial Openness is evident,
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consistent, and significant. Exchange rates appear to have a small effect on trade volatility as
presumed in the literature review. Lastly, Regional Trade Agreements reduce trade volatility
while financial crises increase the volatility.
4.3 Argentine Sectoral Analysis
With respect to Imports: General trends regarding Financial Openness, Real GDP, and Pop-
ulation are consistent across the Import sectors from what was seen in the Global regression.
Here again we see that Financial Openness has a stabilizing force on the import volatility.
However, it should be noted that the findings are not strictly negative across all sectors, nor
are they significant in all sectors. In both Capital Goods and Automobiles, the volatility was
seen to increase with openness in the 4 period timeframe, however not in a significant way.
Similar to the phenomena that were seen in the Global regressions for Financial Openness, the
sign of the coefficients decrease and significance of the coefficients increase with the expanded
timeframes. This means that the once positive coefficients turn negative in the case of Capital
Goods and remain positive albeit less significant in the case of Automobiles. A possible
explanation for the increased volatility seen Capital Goods and Automobiles will be discussed
later during the sector by sector analysis. However it is prudent to say at this moment in
our analysis that the once not significant coefficients in both of these sectors become more
negative and more significant over time. As was the case in the Global regressions, this could
likely be attributed to the expanded timeframes ability to better capture the true volatility.
Interestingly, two specific sectors that are noteworthy due to possible effects from govern-
ment policy: Autos and Capital Goods. In the case of Autos an import tax on autos and
autoparts has been made stronger over time; most recently in 2014; this would show up in the
four year, but not the eight year. In the case of Capital, the government placed import tax
in 2011; this would show up in the 4 year but not the eight year.
At this point it would be best to bring up the presence of structural breaks in the volatility
for two sectors after the Peso Default: Fuels Imports and Primary Products Exports. These
two sectors were also most likely affected by government policy. In the case of Fuels, the
industry was nationalized after the default; thus lending itself to changes in behavior. As for
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Primary Products, there is a much less clear explanation, however it is after the Peso Default
that the economy switched to a floating exchange rate; thus changes in cost structure for the
domestic firms might have been affected.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be said that financial openness does indeed decrease trade volatility.
However, the effects are largely a nice byproduct and shouldn’t be the aim of increased open-
ness. To say this another way, in the specific case of Argentina whose economy is estimated
to be around 600 billion USD in 2013, an increase in openness will result in lower sectoral
volatility of only a few million dollars annually. This is hardly a strong motivating factor for
large changes in and economy’s financial openness.
However, the effects are present and perhaps might become more pronounced and lesser de-
veloped economies where economic stability can have larger and longer impacts on its growth.
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Table 3: Global Trade Volatility (per.8)
VARIABLES Exports Imports
Financial Openness -899.8 -697.2
(-555.1) (-473.4)
Exchange Rate -0.374* -0.400**
(-0.19) (-0.187)
SAFTA -5,043 -1,206
(-3,549) (-5,702)
NAFTA 17,173** 28,570
(-8,124) (-18,217)
MERCOSUR -2,187 -1,868
(-1,678) (-1,568)
GAFTA -1,225 -2,163
(-1,730) (-1,352)
CAFTA -6,319*** -5,875***
(-1,558) (-1,549)
CEFTA -4,872* -4,291
(-2,708) (-3,078)
COMESA -3,896** -3,396**
(-1,515) (-1,628)
WTO 2,303 2,098
(-1,590) (-1,616)
Latin American Crisis 122.1 1,005
(-531.3) (-874.9)
Asian Financial Crisis 1,270 3,526***
(-1,134) (-1,287)
Russian Ruble Crisis 708 1,191
(-769.5) (-915.4)
Global Financial Crisis 4,691 6,867*
(-2,997) (-4,148)
Constant -2,841 -608.6
(-16,927) (-14,665)
Observations 4,608 4,608
Number of Countries 157 157
Adjusted R-squared 0.239 0.269
Period FE YES YES
Country FE YES YES
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Table 5: Import Volatility in Argentina (per. 4)
VARIABLES Import FOB Freight Insurance
Financial Openness -89.28 -4.828 -0.903*
(-71.17) (-4.417) (-0.495)
Real GDP 845.6** 94.51*** 5.631*
(-406.3) (-31.56) (-3.127)
Population 429.3 -111.1 -24.71
(-2,496) (-168.6) (-17.82)
Exchange Rate -138.4 -3.153 -0.636
(-115.3) (-6.819) (-0.781)
Financial Crisis 96.21 -18.48** -1.689**
(-87.63) (-7.74) (-0.645)
Peso Default 579.9*** 33.37*** 4.082***
(-168.4) (-9.624) (-1.147)
Constant -11,624* -776.4** 21.91
(-6,194) (-379.9) (-46.11)
Observations 54 54 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.265 0.258 0.189
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Table 7: Evidence of Structural Breaks (per. 4)
Primary Products Exports Fuels Imports
VARIABLES Before 2001 After 2001 Before 2001 After 2001
Financial Openness 14.57 659.2*** -18.30*** -26.45
(-20.95) (-174) (-5.827) (-70.04)
Real GDP -656.6 12,448** 70.9 -780.6
(-426.2) (-4,686) (-63.27) (-2,054)
Population 4,370 -20,273 -100.6 -41,619**
(-3,757) (-64,327) (-506.7) (-19,481)
Exchange Rate -324.6*** 242.9 24.31 265.8
(-64.89) (-585.2) (-24.97) (-171.8)
Constant -7,612 -74,259 -827 152,950**
(-9,295) (-236,199) (-1,152) (-69,271)
Observations 30 24 30 24
Adjusted R-squared 0.187 0.506 0.41 0.92
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